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TITLE OF THESIS/TITRE DE LA THÈSE LENINIST PARTY ORGANIZATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SOME NOTES TOWARDS AN INVESTIGATION

UNIVERSITY/UNIVERSITÉ UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED/ GRADE POUR LEQUEL CETTE THÈSE FUT PRÉSENTÉE M.A.

YEAR THIS DEGREE CONFERRED/ANNÉE D'OBTENTION DE CE DEGRÉ 1974

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LENINIST PARTY ORGANIZATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SOME NOTES TOWARDS AN INVESTIGATION

by

© ALAN MICHAEL SHANDRO

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

EDMONTON, ALBERTA
FALL, 1974

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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ABSTRACT

The control of the repressive state apparatus by the bourgeoisie and the pervasiveness of bourgeois ideology among the working class in capitalist society are the two most important factors determining the activities of revolutionary socialist parties. Such parties are faced with the possibility of becoming isolated sects, on the one hand, or, on the other, of becoming mass parties at the cost of abandoning or diluting their revolutionary ideology. Lenin's theory of party organization is a means of avoiding both these alternatives. The main features of Leninist party organization are: first, the unification of the party under a single guiding center; and second, the extremely high degree of dedication and political activity which is required of every party member.

Democracy is a valuable form of political organization and socialists, including Leninists, claim to be supporters of democracy. However, evaluated in terms of liberal-democratic theory, the Leninist party is not a democratic institution. The key concept in liberal-democratic theory is the concept of individual rights. The Leninist party is undemocratic in liberal-democratic terms because it lacks the means to systematically enforce the rights of individual members against the party leadership. This judgement must, however, be tempered by the realization that the concept of individual rights is absent from Leninist theory. Leninist theory contains a distinctive conception of democracy. On this conception democracy signifies the active engagement of the masses in a common project. Evaluated in

terms of this conception, the Leninist party is democratic. This conception, however, fails to cope adequately with the problem of control of the masses over the leadership. To remedy this failure, theoretical investigations are called for on the part of Leninist theorists.

PREFACE

During the past two or three years I have been involved with a group of persons, both Marxists and non-Marxists, which has established a continuing discussion on some of the important problems of left-wing politics. One problem which has persistently emerged from this discussion is the compatibility of democracy with the socialist movement. Hitherto, those who have been faithful to bourgeois electoral democracy have had their hopes for socialist revolution crushed. Only Marxist-Leninist parties have led successful socialist revolutions and they have used drastic and dictatorial measures to consolidate their revolutions. In my view, if we are to avoid speculation and base our theory on actual practice, then the problem of democracy and socialism must be posed in the context of Leninism. Specifically, it must be posed in the context of the Leninist party because, in Leninist theory, the party is the indispensible leading element in the transformation of society.

In this thesis, I will discuss the question of whether or not the Leninist party is democratic. In order to pose this question correctly two things are necessary. First, it is necessary to have an understanding of the organizational structure of the Leninist party. Therefore, in the first chapter, I have outlined Lenin's theory of party organization within the context of Marxist theory. Second, it is necessary to achieve some clarity about the concept of democracy. This is the primary concern of the second chapter. The thesis does not reach any definitive conclusion but I hope that, by outlining Lenin's theory of party organization and by pointing out some conceptual controversies

and problems. it constitutes a step towards posing the question in an adequate form. I further hope that it may throw some light upon the broader question of whether or not a Leninist post-revolutionary state is or can be democratic.

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CHAPTER I

THE LENINIST THEORY OF PARTY ORGANIZATION

The Leninist theory of the party is an outgrowth of classical Marxism. It constitutes a systematic response to the requirements posed for the proletarian revolutionary movement by Marx and Engels' analyses of capitalist society. In this chapter I will outline the Marxist theory of the state and the ideological superstructure. This will serve as a basis for understanding the role that a political party must play in a revolutionary movement. The nature of the functions which a revolutionary party must perform are such that the problem of party organization will be seen to be important. The chapter will conclude with a fairly detailed account of Lenin's theory of party organization and it will be seen, en route, how this theory deals with the strategic problems facing a revolutionary party.

The most general propositions of historical materialism, taken together with Marx's brilliant dissection of capitalist relations of production, demonstrate in an abstract fashion the necessity of proletarian revolution. But the first precondition of proletarian revolution is the seizure of state power by the working class so as to be able to smash the existing bourgeois state apparatus. This is the nodal point around which all strategy and tactics must revolve. The party must be, in the first place, an instrument for the seizure of state power by the proletariat.[1] Any instrument must be understood in terms of its use and since the use of the party is to seize state power,

an outline of the state in capitalist society is a prerequisite to understanding the party.

The state is for Marx, the dominant class itself, insofar as it organizes its own domination.[2] The structural effect of this organization is the reproduction of the social relations of production in a form which serves the interests of the dominant class. The reproduction of social relations is effected in two major ways: through repression and through ideology. Corresponding in general to these two different means is the distinction between those institutions which are centralized under the state power, the state apparatus, and those which are relatively more autonomous. The state apparatus is constituted by the police, the army, and the bureaucracy. Its violence is the final weapon of the ruling class when all else has failed it. In the absence of a revolutionary situation the state apparatus implements and enforces the legislation of the ruling class outlawing, de facto or de jure, activities which are necessary to the struggle of the oppressed class. However, the state apparatus in the most developed capitalist countries is typically under the authority of a legislature elected by universal suffrage. To control the legislature, the representatives of the capitalist class must gain the support of large sections of the working class. Thus, barring a revolt of the state apparatus against the elected officials of the state (which, historically, has characterized every proletarian revolution to some extent), the interests of the bourgeoisie can command the state only if that class posseses ideological hegemony throughout.

Let us make no mistake. The ideological hegemony of the bourgeoisie is not a matter of a free and open debate of political

philosophies in which the proletariat chooses, by some act of free will, against its class interests. In the first place, ideologies only exist in and through social institutions - institutions which, in the form of various ritualized practices, pervade the entire life of each person in a society.[3] In capitalist society, to the extent that the bourgeoisie is ideologically hegemonic, these institutions and practices are impregnated with and purvey bourgeois ideology. A simple example is the practice of clocking in and out of work, which, connected as it is with time-wages, reinforces the idea that the wage labourer sells, not his labour-power, but his labour, and so obfuscates the theft of surplus-value by the capitalist. Repeated millions of times, such practices form a complex and radical bond upon the proletarian. Second, these ideological institutions and practices only operate behind the "shield" of the repressive state apparatus. This indicates not only the position of the state apparatus as the final line of defence of the bourgeoisie, not only the intervention of repression at any point in the system of ideological institutions and practices where bourgeois hegemony is seriously threatened. It also indicates the determinant position of the state power in relation to ideological practices. It is the state power which, in the last analysis, assigns to institutions and practices their legal or illegal, public or private, political or non-political character. This entails limitations upon the actions which are considered legitimate or even coherent within a given institution. For example, in capitalist society the conduct and administration of education, is designated to be a technical, a-political matter. This despite the fact that educational institutions impart knowledge along with and through a set of social relations of dominance and subordination, fitting

each pupil with an ideology appropriate to his or her place within the social division of labour and system of exploitation. To say, however, that education is political, is illegitimate; this kind of statement can be easily ignored. Until recently such a statement was, perhaps, a sign of psychological problems - hence there was no need to investigate the reality. This is not to say that there is no resistance to the dominance of the bourgeoisie. The point is, rather, that to the extent that the bourgeoisie retains ideological hegemony, resistance takes place within forms prescribed as legitimate by bourgeois ideology. To this extent, then, resistance can achieve reforms but it cannot achieve the revolutionary transformation of society in the interests of the working class. As Lenin wrote,

> the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade-union consciousness, i.e., the conviction that it is necessary to combine in unions, fight the employers, and strive to compel the government to pass necessary labour legislation, etc. The theory of socialism, however, grew out of the philosophic, historical, and economic theories elaborated by educated representatives of the propertied classes, by intellectuals.[4]

This, then, is the situation confronting the revolutionary party - the entire immense superstructure of capitalist society, a reality which is at once the weapon of the enemy, the battleground, and the stakes. Basing itself upon the objective fundamental antagonism of interests between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and the first, more or less inchoate, more or less unconscious and undirected struggles of the workers, the party has the task of constructing, with only the materials supplied by bourgeois society, the instrument with which to smash that society and reconstruct a new, socialist society. If the

theory of revolutionary socialism is to become a distinct political trend, it must be "embodied" by a political institution, the party. But this means that the party must begin as a small group of socialist intellectuals and theoretically advanced workers. In order to achieve a successful revolution, however, it cannot remain a small group. The party must strive to form close, extensive practical ties with the workers so as to relate its ideology and theory to the experiences of the workers in such a way that the latter can grasp, through their experiences, the necessity of socialist revolution. But this must also be done in such a way that the party does not forfeit the advantages which it has over the masses of ordinary workers, specifically, the possession of a theory which comprehends the development of capitalist society toward proletarian revolution and socialism and an ideology which consists in comprehensive and unremitting opposition to the bourgeoisie. In order to defend its revolutionary ideology against the encroachments of trade-unionist or reformist ideology, which Lenin referred to as "the ideological enslavement of the workers by the bourgeoisie",[5] the party must maintain its institutional autonomy from the working class. This is doubly necessary because of the repressive nature of the state apparatus - the possibility of violent reaction by the ruling class against any revolutionary action or tendencies cannot be ignored. The party must be prepared to carry out both legal and illegal, open and clandestine activities. Thus, a high degree of secrecy is necessary and this in turn means the party cannot be open to everyone, it must be an exclusive organization distinct from the working class as a whole.

The function of the party is to effect a synthesis of itself and

the working class on the basis of revolutionary politics and socialist ideology and theory.

> The union of the broad popular masses with an aim reaching beyond the existing social order, the union of the daily struggle with the great world transformation, this is the task of the social democratic government, which must logically grope on its road of development between the following two rocks: abandoning its final aim, falling into bourgeois reformism or into sectarianism, anarchism or opportunism.[6]

This quotation from Rosa Luxemburg correctly locates the recurring dangers which a revolutionary party must face. For Luxemburg, however, the party "gropes". This is indeed an apt description of the social democratic parties at the turn of the century. But it is also the index of a theoretical lacuna, precisely the problem of party organization. It was Lenin, forced to operate under the weight of Russia's Tsarist autocracy, which made organization a particularly difficult and crucial practical problem, who first posed it as a theoretical problem. In his work of 1902-1903 and particularly in his pamphlet What is to be Done?, Lenin began to elaborate his theory of party organization, later to become known as democratic-centralism. The theory has three closely related component parts: qualifications for membership, organizational structure, and party discipline. The theory is best understood by treating them in that order.

Qualifications for membership in the party became the subject of a debate between Lenin and the Menshevik Julius Martov during and after the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party, held in Brussels and London in July-August, 1903. Martov's formulation of Paragraph 1 of the Party Constitution, which was accepted by the Congress, is as follows: "A member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour

Party is one who accepts its programme, supports the Party financially, and renders it regular personal assistance under the direction of one of its organizations."[7] Lenin's formulation, which appears to differ from Martov's only insignificantly, is this: "A member of the Party is one who accepts its program and who supports the Party both financially and by personal participation in one of the Party organizations."[8] The difference may be summed up by saying that, for Lenin, one cannot be a member of the Party without being a member of a Party organization, whereas for Martov, this is not the case. With Martov's formulation it is unclear whether it is the individual or the organization which decides what activities the individual shall undertake. Lenin wants to combat this unclarity, to say in no uncertain terms that an individual member is subject to the discipline of a Party organization. But it is not solely, or even mainly, a question of discipline. It is just as much a matter of the individual member actively carrying out the Party programme. Here again, Lenin and Martov would seem to be in accord. But the concrete application of the Party programme has its own logic in the sense that it must organize the available resources and relate them to a given set of tasks in the most efficient manner possible. This logic, however, may not accord with the activities or preference of an individual. Let us take, for example, the task of popularizing a revolutionary newspaper. This task has two elements: reading and discussing the newspaper, and selling it. Through discussion the salient points of articles are brought out and comprehended; through selling the response of the masses can be discovered. The better the understanding of the newspaper, the more effectively is it explained to the masses. Conversely, explaining the Party line, listening to the

questions and opinions of the masses, provides a more objective basis for improving the newspaper. As individuals, party members may want to engage in discussions or to sell the newspaper. Insofar as it remains a matter of individual choice, people may "vote with their feet" how, or even if, the task should be carried out. When it is a question for the collective decision of the organization, members must argue for their views, thinking them through and formulating them as best they can and consciously attempting to come to grips with opposing views. Thus, as was previously stated, the difference between Lenin and Martov is not simply over discipline but also over the nature of the activities of party members. Lenin intervenes, not only on behalf of party discipline, but also on behalf of party organizations as a means of actively and consciously involving party members in the life of the party.

Lenin is also concerned here with the circumstances of the growth of the party. In building the party from a small group primarily composed of intellectuals to a mass organization primarily composed of workers, Lenin emphasizes, not the size, but the unity of the party and its adherence to its revolutionary goal. If party membership were open to everyone who expressed agreement with the party's program, there would almost certainly be an influx of people whose commitment to revolutionary socialism is slight or ephemeral. This would pose a threat to the continued dominance of revolutionary ideology and theory within the party. By making it a precondition of party membership that a person should have to work actively and regularly under the discipline of the party, Lenin tries to ensure that only those whose views coincide with those of the party and whose commitment to those views is very strong will join the party. This is meant to give primacy, at any given

time, to the theory and program of the party as already constituted. The party is built only very slowly, "from the top down",[9] by drawing more and more people into close contact with the party. The adherence of sympathizers is consolidated by involving them more and more extensively in the practical work of the party. Thus, while the agitational and propagandistic activities of the party are directed towards the entire working class and all other oppressed or disaffected groups, the party does not seek to encompass the entire proletariat organizationally.

What are the organizations in which the individual members of a Leninist party work? In answering this question, it must be remembered that "the Party is not merely the sum total of Party organizations. The Party is at the same time a single system of these organizations, their formal union into a single whole".[10] Like any other social institution, the Leninist party is characterized by a certain division of labour - the organizations in the party are not homogeneous nor are the relations between them homogeneous. Lenin distinguished two categories of organization within the party: first, "organizations of workers (and of elements of other classes), as broad and as varied as possible"[11]; second, organizations of professional revolutionaries. The first category corresponds to the most widespread, the base, level of the party, composed of the basic units or cells of the party, located among the masses of workers, peasants, and other groups.

Maurice Duverger further characterizes the basic organizational unit of Leninist parties as the "workplace cell".[12] The workplace cell is distinguished by its relatively small number of members and by its occupational rather than geographical, basis. Organized in the factory or workplace, cells possess strong bonds of party solidarity, built up

through the common work experience of the members. Hence, not only is the cell characterized by strong discipline, it is most capable of effective political work. The importance of workplace cells should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, it is misleading to think of them as the constitutive unit of Leninist organization. Lenin insisted, repeatedly, that the basic units of the party be "as broad and as varied as possible".[13] Party cells should be organized in military organizations, in consumers' co-operatives and housing associations, in government institutions, and in ethnic, cultural, and sporting associations. Duverger himself notes that "area cells" have preponderated over workplace cells in the French Communist Party.

This leaves us still with the problem of characterizing the Leninist cell, of discovering what the various cells in a Leninist party have in common which distinguished them from the basic organizational units of other parties (the caucus, the constituency association, or the party "branch" generally associated with Socialist parties). It is possible to solve this problem by examining the specific nature of Marxist political strategy. Marxists have always pointed out the limitations of parliamentarism and of electoral politics, long before they organized themselves into cells. They have always carried out agitational, propagandistic, and organizational work outside the sphere of official politics, striving to unite the political struggle with the everyday struggles in every corner of society, irrespective of the form of their organization. This is a profound change, not only in the concept of a political party, but also, and more fundamentally, in the concept of political practice. The object of political practice shifts from parliament and elections to the struggles waged by working people

on all fronts, not only at the place of work, but also in their relations with the state apparatus, and in housing, co-operative, and cultural organizations. In consequence of this shift, the methods of political practice must change from an emphasis on developing an election platform for which the greatest number of people will vote to an emphasis on assisting the struggles of the workers and all people who are oppressed by capitalism and providing practical and theoretical leadership for them. The specificity of the Marxist concept of political practice is that it entails a close relationship with the masses, spanning the entire range of their activity. Thus, it makes necessary and possible the obligation of cadres to go beyond mere theoretical acceptance of the party program and actually to apply it.

It is this new practice of politics which explains the importance of the workplace cell as an organizational unit, and not the other way around. Organization must facilitate political work among the masses. But the experiences, problems, and concerns of the masses are not confined to the point of production nor are all of the masses industrial workers who can be easily organized at their place of work. Thus, the Marxist concept of political practice entails that party cells be organized, not according to electoral categories, and not simply according to the structure of production, but according to the structure of the masses' experiences and problems. To be clear, Leninist cells are organized within the institutions in which the masses experience the oppression of class society. The importance of the workplace cell consists in the tangibility of <u>class</u> oppression at the point of production and in the strategic importance of concentrated industry and the concentration of the workers themselves. Thus, the basic units of the

Leninist party are distinguished first, by their social basis among the masses and secondly, by their relatively small size, which, as Duverger notes,[14] facilitates disciplined, cohesive, systematic, and efficient work.

The function of the cell, then, is to link the Leninist party with the masses. But this is not accomplished by passively echoing the sentiments and aspirations of the masses. The cell members must be able to apply Marxist-Leninist theory and the party program to the concrete situation in which they find themselves so as to provide leadership for the masses. Specifically, they must be able to translate the diverse and inchoate experiences of the masses into a concentrated and coherent picture of capitalist oppression and, by explaining this picture to the masses, transform their diffuse sentiments and aspirations into a united and determined struggle for political power. Their size and their very imbeddedness in local conditions prohibit the cells from carrying out these tasks on their own. Just as the struggle for power must be waged against the reality of a centralized and extensive state apparatus, so must the picture of local reality be coloured by its integration into a complex social formation. It is impossible to comprehend political and social reality adequately or to act upon it effectively simply on the basis of local experiences. Thus a centralized party apparatus is necessary in order to co-ordinate and direct the work of all the cells. This apparatus consists of a Central Committee and of a system of organizations acting as a liason between the Central Committee and the cells. Lenin made it a principle that the apparatus "consist first and foremost of people who make revolutionary activity their profession".[15] His reasons were, in essence, twofold and

although they are especially relevant to the Central Committee, they are also applicable to the liason organizations. First, Lenin maintained "that no revolutionary movement can endure without a stable organization of leaders maintaining continuity".[16] Continuity of leadership is necessary in order to ensure that the program and work of the party maintain consistency while at the same time keeping pace with events. Thus, leaders must be full-time revolutionaries to gain the experience necessary to integrate the party's over-all strategy with tactical shifts in a rapidly moving situation. They must be professionals in the further sense of having expertise in dealing with the attempts of the state apparatus to disrupt the continuity of the revolutionary organization. Second, Lenin held that the class war "is a hundred times more difficult, protracted and complex than the most stubborn of ordinary wars between states".[17] The "generals" in this war must be capable of conceiving and implementing the most diverse manoeuvres. This requires theoretical depth and broad historical and social knowledge coupled with political "savvy" acquired from long and rounded revolutionary experience. Thus, neither dilettantism nor the necessity of otherwise earning a living are compatible with revolutionary leadership.

The primary function of the Central Committee is to organize and lead the execution of the political program of the party. The party program is determined by the Party Congress (which will be discussed later). However, the Central Committee must have a large amount of leeway in moulding the program to the changing conditions of political struggle as, for example, the incidence of an insurrectionary opportunity cannot be assumed to coincide with a Party Congress. Thus, the

operation of the Central Committee is not confined to straight forward mechanical applications of periodically elaborated principles. Nor is its scope limited to generalities. In order to lead the party it must strive to develop the closest possible practical ties with all party organizations. In the first place, the Central Committee must keep itself informed of significant events in all areas of the country, of the mood of the masses, of the activities, difficulties, and requirements of party organizations. It analyzes this information according to Marxist-Leninist theory, determining the general direction of the society, the key struggles at any given moment, the precise balance of forces, and the needs of the revolutionary movement. On this basis it formulates a system of propaganda as a useful guide for all militants, emphasizing the key issues and struggles while relating them to every form of oppression and struggle in society. The Central Committee also formulates directives which engage the party organizations on current tasks and concentrate the forces of the party on the most decisive tasks. The liason organization act as a "transmission belt"[18] between the Central Committee and the cells. They are of two types. Where the party is large enough to warrant it there are regional or local committees. The function of these committees is to co-ordinate and guide the activities of the cells in a particular area, referring to the Central Committee information, difficulties, and disagreements which are of sufficient importance. The second type of liason organization is comprised of units which are formed around specialized tasks necessary for gathering of information and the formulation and dissemination of propaganda and directives. Examples are groups formed to research specific subjects, groups which operate the media of propaganda, such as the

printing of newspapers, and groups responsible for tracking down spies and police agents. Without going into any detail, it is obvious that the party apparatus can become large and complex.

Hitherto, we have considered party organization only from the point of view of a "technical division of labour", that is, as the optimum, the most efficient, distribution of the necessary functions of the party among its component elements. But party organization is no more a purely technical matter than is the organization of a society or of a factory. The aims of the party are political and social and the development of its activities will inevitably generate disputes over "the party line", ranging from the general strategy of the party to the tactics to be employed in a very specific situation. Although many disputes can be resolved without recourse to authority, the party must maintain definite relations of authority so as to ensure the resolution of disputes and, hence, the continued coherent functioning of the party. The main elements of the relations of authority in the Leninist party can be outlined as follows:

(1) the individual is subordinate to the organization;
(2) the minority is subordinate to the majority;
(3) the lower level is subordinate to the higher level; and
(4) the entire membership is subordinate to the Central Committee.[19]

The first and fourth points require some elaboration. It should be noted in connection with the latter that the Central Committee is elected by, and derives its authority from, the Party Congress, which, when it is in session, is the supreme authority of the party. Under normal circumstances a Congress is convened at least once every one or two years although, under special circumstances, the Central Committee

may take the initiative to convene the Congress early or to postpone it. The delegates to the Congress are elected by the party cells and, as well as electing a Central Committee, it is their task to determine the party's political line for the coming period. There is no aspect of the party's activity upon which the Congress cannot deliberate and pass binding decisions. But inasmuch as the Congress is only in session for a limited period of time and beyond this period its authority passes to the Central Committee, it is the latter which is typically the highest authoritative body in the party.

Point one above seems superfluous in light of the other three points. But, unlike the others, it should be understood to refer not to the making of decisions, but only to their execution. Although all party members will not agree with a decision of the party, all must accept it, strive to implement it, and support and defend it outside party circles. This is necessitated by the engagement of all party members in the practical work of the party and by the need for coherence and unity in this work. Such "iron discipline", as Stalin puts it, "does not preclude but presupposes criticism and conflict within the Party, ... does not preclude but presupposes conscious and voluntary submission."[20] Such an extraordinary degree of party solidarity can be achieved only through widespread discussion and debate of party policy. Thus, where there is contention within the party over issues of general significance, it is incumbent upon the Central Committee to facilitate, as far as the circumstances will allow, a broad discussion of the issues and of the alternative policies proposed. For example, the Bolshevik policy towards the trade-unions was the subject of extensive and sometimes bitter debate in the months prior to the Tenth Party Congress in

March, 1921. The Central Committee and the upper levels of the party were split three ways between those, led by Trotsky and Bukharin, who wanted the trade unions to become organs of the state; those, led by Shlyapnikov and Alexandra Kollontai, who wanted the trade unions to run the state; and those, led by Lenin and comprising the majority of the Central Committee, who took a "middle" course, advocating autonomy of the trade unions from the state. Through the initiative of the Central Committee, the debate was conducted through the press, through numerous meetings, and through the publication of pamphlets outlining and advocating each position. In the course of the debate, the great majority of party members were united around the "middle" position. The point is not simply that the party members were able to learn a great deal about trade union policy through engaging in an intensive discussion, although this is doubtless true. Nor is it only that, because the party policy was arrived at through widespread discussion, the minority who disagreed with it would be less prone to blame their defeat upon "backroom politicking", and consequently more likely to reconcile themselves to it in the interest of party unity. The point is, also, that the degree of solidarity required by Leninist party discipline is not feasible if the party is split into two or three more or less equal blocks. Not only a majority, but a very large majority, is necessary[21] and the likelihood of this emerging increases as more members are drawn into the discussion, as more aspects of the question are explored and clarified, and as the practical experience of more people is brought to bear on the question.

Measures to ensure the unity of the party extend beyond this, however. Factionalism, "the formation of groups (within the party) with separate platforms, striving to a certain degree to aggregate and create

their own group discipline"[22] are banned. The ban is a consequence, not of factions having separate platforms,[23] but of their segregating and having a group discipline. Lenin wrote, "factionalism in practice inevitably leads to the weakening of team-work and to intensified and repeated attempts by the enemies of the ... Party, who have wormed their way into it, to widen the cleavage and to use it for counter-revolutionary purposes".[24] Factionalism leads to the weakening of team-work because it tends to institutionalize the divisions among the party members and so makes them more difficult to overcome, whereas in the party organizations the members are grouped according to the tasks which they have to perform together. Factions are havens for counter-revolutionaries because their segregation tends toward backroom politicking and conspiracy. Thus, they interfere with party-wide discussion and debate. If a party member has a policy which he wants to promote, he does not need to form a special factional organization to campaign for it. Rather, he can and should present it to the party organization within which he works and if he cannot gain the support of that organization, he can and should appeal to higher levels, up to and including the Central Committee, and through the Central Committee to the party as a whole. Taken together, the measures to strengthen party unity mean, in effect, that party members may not engage in politics outside of the context of party organization and discipline. The intensity and vigour of the party activities and debates are to firmly unite the party members around their common goal and to hasten the advance of the party and the working class toward that goal.

CHAPTER II

LENINISM AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY

The previous chapter outlined the Leninist theory of party organization primarily as a response to strategic problems of the proletarian revolution. In this chapter the theory will be examined from the point of view of political ethics. Specifically, this chapter will seek to determine whether or not the Leninist party is democratic. Socialists, including Leninists, have always claimed to be supporters of democracy. Indeed, democracy, as a form of political organization, is to be valued, and especially by socialists, because it precludes the arbitrary rule of a few persons over the great majority. Even more importantly, it signifies the active participation of the masses in organizing and controlling their own affairs. In my own view, this means that a way of life which is to be highly valued is open to many people. In this chapter, a prevalent theory of democracy, which I shall call "liberal-democratic" theory, will be outlined and it will be shown that, judged in terms of this theory, the Leninist party is not democratic. It will then be shown that there is a different and distinctive Leninist conception of democracy which is embodied by the Leninist party. Finally, a problem with this conception of democracy will be raised. No conclusion will be drawn as to the democratic or non-democratic nature of the Leninist party but it will be seen that knowledge of the different conceptions of democracy is a necessary basis for such a conclusion.

The most prevalent conception of democracy, at least in our

society, is that provided by what I shall call liberal-democratic theory. Liberal-democratic theory acknowledges the original conception of democracy as the rule of the people but recognizes that in any large and complex society the people as a whole cannot continuously engage in ruling. The state must be set up as a specialized agency to rule on behalf of the people as a whole. This, however, necessitates that certain measures be taken to ensure that the state really does rule on behalf of the people, that the persons who control the state act as the representatives of the people and not as their rulers. Liberal-democratic theory meets this problem by stipulating that the important affairs of the government be decided on the basis of some form of majoritarianism by persons elected by the whole people. This solution is itself subject to two problems. First, there is no guarantee that a stable majority would not abuse minorities. Second, it is possible that the elected representatives of the people could use the power of the state to suspend or manipulate electoral and constitutional arrangements and effectively entrench themselves in power independently of the will of the people. To protect minorities and to ensure that electoral competition will be fair enough to give the electorate control over their representatives, liberal-democratic theory uses the concept of individual rights.

The concept of individual rights is the lynch-pin of liberal-democratic theory as well as its most distinctive feature. In our intuitive conception of them, rights seem to delineate a sphere of autonomous action, of activity which ought to be free and uncoerced. For example, that I have a right to vote means, not that I will vote or that I ought to vote, but that I am free to vote or not as I please. Most

rights of any significance imply correlative obligations. Thus, my right to vote obligates certain persons, for example, the polling clerk, to assist me should I decide to vote. That I have the right, and thus that certain others have the correlative obligations, is a consequence of my occupying a certain status in a collectivity. In the present example, I hold the status of citizen, above a specified age, of some country. The concept of individual rights functions, in liberal-democratic theory, as a limitation upon the actions of any other persons with respect to an individual and particularly upon the legitimate use of state power. There are certain areas of activity within which each individual is sovereign and may not be interfered with. Most importantly for our purposes, popular control of representatives requires that each citizen or member of a collectivity have the right to freedom of speech and freedom of association. Minorities may use these rights to organize and publicize opposition to the present government, providing the people with alternatives from which to choose their representatives. The possibility of replacement makes the representatives responsible to the people. In liberal-democratic theory individual rights and majority rule are complementary, not contradictory.

Judged in terms of liberal-democratic theory, the Leninist party is undemocratic because the rights of individual members of the party are severely circumscribed and because there is no plausible guarantee of the enforcement of those rights which do exist. To have any control over the party leaders, members must have the right to try to shape the policies of the party. This implies that members have the rights to freedom of speech. But from our outline of democratic centralism it is evident that this right is subject to several restrictions. First, freedom of

speech is restricted to views which do not contradict the party's comprehensive Marxist world-view or its political program. This, however, is not a restriction which would be felt as such by the members because membership in the party is contingent upon acceptance of its political program. The limits of debate are, however, further restricted by the development of the party's activities and of its program, which is elaborated in response to the challenges encountered in pursuance of its activities. Perhaps the most important historical example of this is the debate which took place among the Bolsheviks after their seizure of power as to the force with whom the Russian proletariat should ally itself. Trotsky's view was that the only ally of the Russian proletariat was the Western European proletariat. The workers would not find support among the Russian peasantry and so must bend their efforts to kindle the fire of revolution in Western Europe. The opposing view, championed by Stalin, was that foreign workers, while sharing an ultimate interest in socialist revolution, were in no position to come to the aid of the fledgling Societ state. Therefore, the Russian workers, far from carrying a "permanent revolution" beyond their borders, must ally themselves with the peasantry so as to construct a socialist bastion in one country. For several years after the Russian Revolution it appeared as though the Western European proletariat might well make a revolution. But by the mid 1920s it had become evident that a period of revolutionary depression had set it, that Western Europe would remain quiescent. Those who continued to adhere to Trotsky's view were expelled from the Party. Whether the objective consequences of a given strategy or tactic are useful or harmful to the revolutionary cause becomes apparent only over time. Thus views whose adequacy is debatable at one time may later be

seen to bear reactionary consequences unacceptable to a revolutionary party.

A third restriction upon debate in Leninist parties is constituted by the need to carry out the practical tasks of the party. To put it simply, this means that one cannot spend all one's time debating what one is going to do if anything is actually going to be done at all. This restriction is not specific to Leninist parties but it is more pronounced in them because of the greater extent of their practical activities and the involvement of every party member in these activities. It should be noted, however, that this is a restriction, not upon what can be said in debate, but upon the extensiveness of debate. Nevertheless, it is not likely to limit all views equally. Rather, the views of minorities are liable to be handicapped in comparison with those of the majority because the latter will initially be put into practice and even limited effectivness in practice will tend to speak more loudly than great successes in theory. While not, strictly speaking, a restriction on freedom of speech, this is a restriction upon the effective participation of some members of the party. Finally, freedom of speech is limited to intra-party debate. Although party members may disagree with and try to change some of the party's policies by initiating debate within the party, where they come into contact with non-party members they are bound to explain and defend the program and policies of the party, despite whatever personal reservations they may hold. Illustrations of both these restrictions is an incident which occurred just prior to the Bolshevik seizure of power. Intra-party debate over the proposed insurrection was limited by the necessity of reaching a decision before the opportunity slipped away. Two members of the Bolshevik Central

Committee, Kamenev and Zinoviev publicly expressed their opposition to the planned revolution and in so doing revealed the details of the Bolshevik battle plan. Lenin and many others clamoured for their expulsion from the Party and perhaps the only reason that they were not expelled was that the Bolsheviks were immediately beset by the problems of success.

None of these restrictions can be said to be peculiar to the Leninist party. But a revolutionary party seeking to transform the social order and using both legal and illegal means requires a much greater degree of secrecy and party solidarity that do other parties. Therefore, these restrictions will be correspondingly stricter in a Leninist party that in other parties. Nevertheless, if the whole difference between Leninist and non-Leninist parties consisted in the extent of the restrictions upon the right of freedom of speech, then a Leninist party could well be democratic in liberal-democratic terms. But this leaves one crucial question unposed - the question of the enforcement of right involves "systematic compulsion exertable on behalf of the possessor of the right, for his benefit or ... in execution of his functions."[1] It is clear that where a threat to the rights of a Leninist party member is posed by members of a party cell or by an intermediate level of the party organization, the Central Committee has the authority to enforce these rights. But if the Central Committee itself becomes a threat to rights, are there any means provided in Leninist party organization by which rights may be defended against the Central Committee? Theoretically, a Party Congress could censure the Central Committee. But by its function as theoretical and practical leader of the party, the Central Committee is in a position to muffle,

if not silence, the complaints of those who feel they have been denied the right to try to influence party policy. It is in a position to influence the composition of Congress and the issues which are brought before them to a large extent. There is no other party body or organization which is independent of the authority of the Central Committee. Were factionalism not banned from the Leninist party, factions could serve as means of rallying opposition to an autocratic Central Committee, of publicizing views which would otherwise be suppressed. The ban on factions thus appears as a means of surreptitiously enshrining the Central Committee as a leviathan. Equally, the unitary, rather than federal, structure of the party could appear, from this point of view, not as a means of allowing all party members to contribute to debates upon all issues, but as a means of fully subordinating party members to the Central Committee.

None of this is to say that the Central Committee of a Leninist party is likely to behave in an autocratic manner. This is not the point. The point is, rather, that, should it so decide, it is in a position to do so with relative impunity. Party members retain their rights only through the good will of the Central Committee and they have no guarantee of the tenure of this good will. But if the preservation of democratic rights is dependent upon the will of the few members of the Central Committee, then Leninist party organization must be said to be undemocratic.

It must be understood that to judge Leninist party organization in terms of liberal-democratic theory is to impose upon it a standard of judgement external to the terms in which it was conceived. This is not to say that Lenin conceived the party solely as a tool for the

realization of socialism, a tool which was to be judged by its efficacy, its democratic or undemocratic character being of no consequence. Rather, it is my contention that Lenin, in producing his theory of party organization, employed a conception of democracy which, while never systematically articulated, is fundamentally distinct from that of liberal-democratic theory. This is evidenced by the 1918 polemic between Lenin and Kark Kautsky over the nature of the socialist state. In his pamphlet, The Dictatorship of The Proletariat, Kautsky established the basic thrust of the Social-Democratic critique of Leninism: "The antagonism of the two Socialist movements ... is the clashing of two fundamentally distinct methods, that of dictatorship and that of democracy".[2] Kautsky goes on to characterize Lenin and the Bolsheviks as exponents of the dictatorial method and to argue against the efficaciousness of this method for the attainment of socialist aims. Although Lenin always remained the hard-headed realist, he does not pursue the debate on grounds of efficacy. Rather, he challenges the terms of the debate.[3] Most importantly, for our purposes, Lenin, contrary to Kautsky, denies that provision for individual rights is a requirement of democracy. For Lenin the state and all political activities are in the interests of one class or another. In capitalist and socialist societies political activity is either for the bourgeoisie or for the proletariat. This should not be taken to mean that a working class state is one in which rights are denied to the bourgeoisie but in which every wage-earner is guaranteed political rights, because some workers may act against the interests of their class. Thus, economically-defined class position cannot be the criterion as to who is to have political rights. Rights can be accorded only to those whose political and ideological

activity will not tend towards the restoration of capitalism. But this is tantamount to the abandonment of the concept of individual rights be- political speech and association, for example, would no longer be areas of activity within which an individual could not legitimately be interfered with.

If the sole difference between Leninism and liberal-democratic theory is the absence from the former of the concept of individual rights, then Leninism is easily construed as nothing more than the assertion that the social conditions for the realization of liberal-democracy are absent. The task of the Leninist party would be to bring about these social conditions even though, in so doing, it would have to deny individual rights. In my view, such a conception of the relation between Leninism and democracy is incorrect. I would suggest instead that the absence of the concept of individual rights from Leninism may be grounded in a conception of democracy which is radically distinct from liberal-democratic theory.

A notable attempt to establish such a distinction was made by C. B. Macpherson in hiw book, The Real World of Democracy. In my view, however, his attempt fails because the conditions which he asserts to be necessary if Leninism is to be democratic are not so clearly outlined as to preclude their being interpreted in terms of liberal-democratic theory. Macpherson tries to delineate a distinctively Leninist conception of democracy by examining what he calls the "vanguard state". The vanguard state grows out of a pre-revolutionary situation in which "a substantial part of the society ... is so dehumanized that only a few of the people at most can be expected to see that they are dehumanized."[4] Under these conditions, the creation of a better society depends upon the

revolutionary seizure of power by a small, conscious vanguard party which "would forcibly transform the basic relations of society in such a way that the people would become undebased and capable of a fully human existence, at which point compulsive government would no longer be needed".[5] Is the Leninist vanguard state democratic? In dealing with this question Macpherson's account is both substantive, in that it is an analysis of the institutional structure of the Leninist vanguard state, and conceptual, in that Macpherson distinguishes two different senses of democracy. In what follows, I will be mainly interested in the conceptual aspect of Macpherson's account. This should be borne in mind because Macpherson's primary concern is with the democratic or non-democratic nature of the Leninist vanguard state while I am primarily concerned, in this thesis, with the nature of the Leninist party. While these two problems are, of course, distinct, the concept of democracy bears upon both of them.

In Macpherson's first sense, democracy refers, not to a system of government, but to a kind of society. Democracy in this broad sense contains "an ideal of human equality, not just equality of opportunity to climb a class ladder, but such an equality as could only be fully realized in a society where no class was able to dominate or live at the expense of others".[6] The vanguard state, according to Macpherson, may be called democratic where development toward this ideal is possible only through the action of a vanguard and where the vanguard remains true to this ideal. It is clear that the ideal to which Macpherson refers is something like Marx's ideal of a classless society. But the terms in which Macpherson would understand this ideal are left vague. On the basis of the thrust of Macpherson's work as a whole, it is not

unlikely that he values this ideal as a society in which each individual is free to develop his abilities to their full extent.[7] This conception is liberal in one important sense, namely that it seems to imply that each individual has certain rights. Thus, the Leninist vanguard state would be construed as merely a dangerous and unfortunately necessary step towards the fullest possible realization of the ideals of liberal-democracy. Macpherson's first sense of democracy does not provide a basis for a distinctive Leninist conception of democracy.

Macpherson enploys democracy, in a second and narrower sense, as "a system of choosing and authorizing governments".[8] A democratic system implies government by the people or at least by the choice of the people so that the people have some control over their leader. A vanguard state, as such, cannot be democratic in this sense because the rationale for vanguard rule is the incapacity of most of the people to wield political power intelligently in their own interests. But Macpherson argues that a vanguard state can "merge into" a democratic state when the transformation of social relations has provided conditions in which the bulk of the people will freely support the new society.[9] According to Macpherson the vanguard-cum-democratic state does not simply adopt the system of competing parties characteristic of liberal-democratic states. The Leninist vanguard party continues to rule, but its rule can be democratic "provided (1) that there is full intra-party democracy, (2) that party membership is open, and (3) that the price of participation in the party is not a greater degree of activity than the average person can reasonably be expected to contribute".[10] Upon examination these conditions are unclear. They are subject to a liberal-democratic interpretation which is incompatible with Leninism. The first condition,

intra-party democracy, is at best ambiguous because it employs the term "democracy" in defining the criterion of democracy. The second condition appears to be clear enough, until we ask for whom it is that party membership is to be open. Is it to be "open" to all those who agree with every theoretical, strategic, tactical, and organizational statement the party has ever made? Or is it to be open to everyone, including those who, violently opposing the revolutionary social order and the aims of the party, desire to join the party in order to change the direction of its activity and subvert its aims? Clearly, both of these extreme alternatives are ludicrous, the first because any party implementing a program of positive social reform will want to have at its disposal the energy and initiative of as many persons as possible, the second because no party could survice on this basis. But we should not be blinded by the improbability of these alternatives - the point is that Macpherson provides no criterion by which we can judge one alternative to be democratic and another less so. The criterion for determining qualifications for party membership may be of two kinds - it may be a principle or a procedure. If it is to be a procedure, under the conditions that Macpherson has laid out it can only be the decision-making mechanism of the party, in which case membership would be open only to those to whom the party extends it. But if it is to be a principle then it is hard to see how it can be conceived as anything other than a right to party membership possessed by everyone or by some limited group of individuals. But the concept of individual rights is, as we have seen, a cornerstone of liberal-democratic theory. On this alternative, Leninism would become a variety of liberalism. Macpherson's third condition is more complex, but it is plagued by the same ambiguity as the second. It is

the goal of the Leninist vanguard party to transform social relations and this means, in part, that it strives to increase the political activity of the people. It must stimulate and challenge the inactive to be more active. Therefore, the "degree of activity that the average person can reasonably be expected to contribute" is not an objectively determinable sum. It is a political question which, again, can be answered either according to a principle or according to a procedure. And, again, the first of these alternatives will imply some conception of individual rights. Thus, on a liberal-democratic interpretation of Macpherson's conditions, the differences between a Leninist vanguard-cum-democratic state and a liberal-democratic state may be reduced to the rule of a single party in the former. But this is not an essential difference as the same pattern of political activity could take place within the single party as between competing parties.

Thus, Macpherson's account fails to establish any grounds for a radical distinction between liberal-democratic theory and a Leninist conception of democracy. In my view Georg Lukács succeeds where Macpherson fails. According to Lukács the Leninist conception of democracy amounts to something like the active engagement of the masses in a common political practice. Lukács begins from Engels' observation that in primitive communist society "there was as yet no distinction between rights and duties".[11] What Engels had in mind was that, for example, for a warrior in a primitive hunting society, hunting was not simply a duty, an imposition, nor was it simply a right, something he could do independently of the will of others. Hunting was not so much an activity to be assigned or chosen as it was a partial definition of one's social identity. Such a situation is possible only if the

interests of the individual and the interests of the collectivity are identical. Strictly speaking, to have a right or a duty does not make sense in such circumstances. But, according to Lukacs, such circumstances are possible only on condition of "the active engagement of the total personality"[12] of each individual in a common project. Lukacs writes, "True democracy, the abolition of the split between rights and duties, is ... the activity of the members of a collective will, closely integrated and collaborating in a spirit of solidarity".[13]

These views are vague. A clearer idea of the point Lukacs is trying to make may be got by referring to the Lenin-Martov debate discussed in the first chapter. There it was seen that Lenin insisted that each person who is to be a party member must work within a party organization. This requirement was shown to express not only a concern for party discipline but also a concern that each individual actively engage in carrying out the party program. It was seen that the logic of carrying out practical tasks imposed a certain "discipline" upon party members. But this logic, or we might simply say the requirements posed by having to deal as a group with the tasks at hand in the most effective manner, is not immediately self-evident. It can only be unearthed if the members have a clear understanding of the task to be accomplished and the reasons for it and if, from their own early, tentative efforts to carry it out, they are able to draw conclusions as to the requirements posed by their specific situation. Thus, for example, if a party cell is to organize a group of workers into a trade union, the cell members must have a good idea of what the functions of unions are, of the relation of unions to the socialist movement, of the difficulties involved in the organization of any union, and of the

difficulties specific to the situation with which they have to deal. On the basis of the logic of practical tasks, the activities to be performed must be allotted among the cell members and co-ordinated in the most effective manner. Thus, the practical tasks of the party and the theory behind those tasks must be discussed and debated collectively. because the decisions made by the organization as a whole will importantly affect each member, each must explain and define his views against the arguments of opposing viewpoints. No one may hold a view or a theory "by right". For example, if Peter disagrees with Paul about whether he, Peter, should "sound out" a certain group of workers about the formation of a trade union, he may legitimately employ an argument to the effect that Paul could perform this task better or with less bother than he. However, it would be unacceptable for Peter to argue that what he does is none of Paul's business or that he has a right to do as he wants. By extension, that Peter should be able <u>even to hold a divergent view</u> is not something which can be justified by reference to his "rights" because the views he holds will have some effect upon the manner in which he carries out party policy. If he cannot, in conscience, change his views, then he must try to convince his comrades that they are correct. Failing this, he may argue that, while he will yield to party discipline and carry out the decision of the majority, the evidence which would be necessary definitively to decide the question is not, as yet, available, or that the divergence of views is of no practical consequence.

What Lukács and, I think, Lenin value as democratic is something like "the unleashing of the energy and initiative of the masses". By actively engaging in a collective project and in reflection and discussion upon that project, people are able to develop their abilities and

to gain a measure of collective control over the circumstances in which they exist. On this conception, the Leninist party is democratic because it tends to stimulate the energy and initiative of the masses of party members. The requirement that party members work within a party organization means that they will be actively involved in the collective task of establishing a socialist society. Organized in cells which are closely in touch with the day-to-day activities of the masses, the work of party members will be extensive and continual. Such a degree of political activity both presupposes and reinforces a strong commitment to this realization of socialism. Where the interests of each individual coincide with those of the collectivity, as is prima facie plausible in the case of the Leninist party, then the absence of individual rights signifies, not the absence of protection for the individual, but the absence of limitations upon the energy and initiative with which the common project is pursued and, as Lukács says, "the absorption of the total personality in the praxis of the movement."[14]

On this conception, the relation between leaders and masses, between the Central Committee and party members, is not one in which the control of one group by the other is a problem. Lukacs writes,

> If every member of the party commits his whole personality and his whole existence to the party ..., then the ... centralizing and disciplinary principle will preside over the living interaction between the will of the members and that of the party leadership and will ensure that the will and the wishes, the proposals and the criticisms of the members are given due weight by the party leaders. Every decision of the party must result in actions by all the members of the party and every slogan leads to deeds in which individual members risk their whole physical and moral existence. For this very reason they are not only well placed to offer

> criticism, they are forced to do so together with their experiences and their doubts. .... (T)he active participation of all members in the daily life of the party, the necessity to commit oneself with one's whole personality to all the party's actions is the only means by which to compel the leadership to make their resolutions really comprehensible to the members and to convince members of their correctness.[15]

The Central Committee member is not a representative of the party members, that is, he does not act in their place or on their behalf. Rather, his experience and theoretical ability make him a guide and a senior participant in an ongoing discussion. That his views may provide the basis for party policy more often than those of an ordinary party member does not indicate that he has some sort of power over the party members but that he is able to grasp more fully and quickly than others the most adequate means for the practical realization of the party's interests.

This line of reasoning presupposes that the party does indeed constitute a genuine community of interests, that all of the party members are genuinely interested in the realization of socialism and that this means approximately the same thing for all of them. But this is to reason without acknowledging the influence of external factors, particularly non-socialist ideologies, upon party members. Socialist ideology and dedication to socialism do not exist in an ideological vacuum. The market mechanism of capitalist society is accompanied by a pervasive individualist ideology which constitutes each person as a possessor of certain (tangible and intangible) commodities which have a value relative to those possessed by others. If ideologies are understood, as in the first chapter, to be "imbedded" in the practices in which each individual engages, then no one in capitalist society or the

first stages of socialism, not even the most dedicated Leninist, can be totally free of the influence of individualist ideology. Although the leaders of a Leninist party would be expected to be more fully dedicated to socialism than others, the practices associated with leadership and the prestige accorded to leaders may be particularly supportive of individualist ideology. This is not to say that leaders would repudiate socialism or even be conscious of departing from it. The point is simply that a leader, particularly when successful, may come to see his own theoretical or political abilities as being of decisive importance to the party and hence may come to regard the dominance of his own views as identical with tne good of the party and of the working class. This process could conceivably go so far as to place the Central Committee in opposition to the party membership. The leaders could develop an interest in the continuance of their own leadership separate from and opposed to the interests of the party as a whole. Thus, the active engagement of the party members in a common project does not constitute a guarantee of unity among the different levels of party organization, only a tendency supportive of it.

Therefore, Leninist theory must pose the problem of control of the Central Committee by the masses of party members. Hitherto, Leninist theoreticians have failed to do this and this failure is reflected in Lukacs' account of the Leninist conception of democracy but this is not to say that the problem is insoluble for Leninist theory. Events in China since the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution seem to indicate certain approaches to its solution in practice, for example, the assignment of high-level party cadres to manual labour, but these practical advances have not as yet yielded an adequate theoretical solution.

Theoretical work on the relation of democracy and the Leninist party is doubly necessary because it may shed some light on the related problem of democracy in a Leninist state. C. B. Macpherson has the merit of having posed this problem and of having suggested a solution but, as we have seen, his solution was not a Leninist one.

To recapitulate: in this chapter I have shown that the concept of individual rights, a key concept in liberal-democratic theory, is absent from Leninist theory and I have outlined a distinctively Leninist conception of democracy. The fact that there are competing conceptions of democracy must be appreciated before the Leninist party can be evaluated adequately. In evaluating the party in terms of the Leninist conception of democracy, it was seen that this conception contains a limitation in the form of a practical problem, that of the relations between leaders and masses, which it does not address. A theoretical solution to this problem was seen to be of great importance. I am not able to conclude this thesis by formulating a definitive answer to the question of the democratic or non-democratic nature of the Leninist party. But the thesis, if it has done anything else, has at least elaborated the terms in which the question must be posed.

CHAPTER I FOOTNOTES

[1]J. V. Stalin, The Foundations of Leninism, in The Essential Stalin, edited by Bruce Franklin (Doubleday and Company, Inc.: Garden City, New York, 1972), pages 170-171.

[2]K. Marx and F. Engels, "The Communist Manifesto", in Selected Works (International Publishers: New York, 1969), page 52.

[3]This view of ideology is developed by L. Althusser in his essay "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" in L. Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (New Left Books: London, 1971).

[4]V. I. Lenin, What is to be Done? (International Publishers: New York, 1969), pages 31-32.

[5]Ibid., page 41.

[6]Rosa Luxemburg, Reform or Revolution, in Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, edited by Mary Alice Waters (Pathfinder Press, Inc.: New York, 1970), pages 88-89.

[7]Quoted in Lenin, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, in Selected Works (Progress Publishers: Moscow, 1970), Volume I, page 307.

[8]Quoted in ibid., Volume I, page 307.

[9]Lenin, quoted in Brian Pearce, "Building the Bolshevik Party - Some Organizational Aspects", in What is Revolutionary Leadership? (Spartacist: New York, 1964), unpaginated.

[10]Stalin, op. cit., page 175. Emphasis is in the original.

[11]Lenin, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, loc. cit., page 324.

[12]Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (Methuen and Co. Ltd.: London, 1965), pages 28-30.

[13]Lenin, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, loc. cit., page 358.

[14]Duverger, op. cit., page 35.

[15]Lenin, What is to be Done? page 109.

[16]Ibid., page 121.

[17]Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism, An Infantile Disorder (Foreign Languages Press: Peking, 1970), page 66.

[18]Lenin, "A Letter to a Comrade on Our Organizational Tasks", in Collected Works (Foreign Languages Publishing House: Moscow, 1960), Volume 6, page 250.

[19]Mao Tse-tung, "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War", in Selected Works (Foreign Language Press: Peking, 1967), Volume II, page 204.

[20]Stalin, op. cit., pages 180-181.

[21]This point is made by Alfred G. Meyer in his book, Leninism (Praeger Publishers: New York, 1971), pages 93-94.

[22]Lenin, Collected Works, Volume 32, page 241.

[23]Ibid., Volume 32, page 261.

[24]Ibid., Volume 32, page 241.

CHAPTER II

[1]David Braybrooke, Three Tests for Democracy (Random House: New York, 1968), page 28.

[2]Karl Kautsky, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat (Longman Canada Ltd.: Don Mills, Ontario, 1971), page 1.

[3]See Lenin, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky (Foreign Languages Press: Peking, 1970), pages 5-29.

[4]Macpherson, The Real World of Democracy (The Hunter Rose Company: Toronto, 1969), pages 19-20.

[5]Ibid., page 19.

[6]Ibid., page 22.

[7]See, for example, ibid., page 47, and Macpherson, Democratic Theory (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1973), page 23.

[8]Macpherson, The Real World of Democracy, page 20.

[9]Ibid., page 20.

[10]Ibid., page 21.

[11]F. Engels, The Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State, quoted in Lukács, History and Class Consciousness (Merlin Press: London, 1964), page 319.

[12]Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, page 319.

[13]Ibid., page 337.

[14]Ibid., page 320.

[15]Ibid., pages 336-337.

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